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Introduction
In many markets, consumers differ regarding their information about how valuable is one Þrm's product compared to that of another Þrm. Well informed consumers may then act as opinion leaders and market makers. As they have superior information, they cannot learn from watching others, and may as well choose early.
1 If other consumers can observe their choices, these other consumers may learn from their choices, and it may be worthwhile to imitate these choices. Early consumers' choices may, hence, determine the choice of all further consumers, a phenomenon that has been studied extensively as herd behavior or as information cascades.
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A consequence of this is that opinion leaders determine the allocation of producer rents. Their decision can determine which producer serves the whole market. Producers are aware of the importance of the market making function of opinion leaders. Producers may therefore try and inßuence these opinion leaders' consumption choices. They are willing to pay for attracting the consumption choice of the opinion leader, and their willingness to pay is mainly determined by the proÞt to be made on the whole market that can be gained by attracting opinion leaders.
If the information spillovers from early consumers to subsequent consumers exist, one should therefore expect to observe considerable inßuence activities, targeted at early consumers. Indeed, the literature on diffusion of innovations has identiÞed the special role of opinion leaders (see, e.g., Rogers 1983, Valente and Davis 1999) in accelerating diffusion processes by word of mouth and by imitation of the opinion leader. 3 The empirical literature also establishes that the information status of an agent is a key factor in whether the agent becomes an opinion leader. 4 Further, these opinion leaders are targets of producers' inßuence activities. The marketing literature has emphasized the importance of advertising and sales via opinion leaders, and textbooks devote chapters on how such strategies could be put in place.
Bribes, gifts, or special rates play a major role as inßuence activities in this context. Wilkie (1986, p.163) , for instance, writes: "This strategy requires locating the socially integrated and socially independent consumers for a particular product category and then promoting the product especially to them, even giving it to them free." Wilkie also reports a case study where particular rock music records were successfully promoted by handing out packages of records for free to a "select panel" of leaders, asking them for their evaluations. Similarly, many products which involve some quality uncertainty, sell with a discount when Þrst introduced in the market. For instance, aircraft manufacturers grant considerable discounts on early orders when launching a new type of aircraft.
5
Ernest Dichter (1966) already summarized the marketing strategy of a Þrm using opinion leaders: to identify opinion leaders, and to make them promote the Þrm's products. But Dichter also acknowledges the basic tradeoff associated with marketing strategies that target opinion leaders. Dichter (1966, p. 157) argues that information transmission from opinion leaders to followers works if, and because, the rewards of the leader are purely psychological and never material: "This very assumption -that no material interest is involved in the recommendation -is the most basic motivation for the 'listener' in accepting and acting on the recommendation." Inßuence activities that affect the choice behavior of opinion leaders may distort the signal that their undistorted choice would give to other consumers, and may make their choice less valuable as an indicator of product quality.
To illustrate: if a new restaurant opens up, the decision of the Þrst few customers may induce an information cascade, making all consumers follow the quality signal that can be deduced from the choices of the early consumers who make one restaurant crowded and look popular. Hence, the restaurant owners are motivated to inßuence the decision making, particularly of early consumers who could induce herding. More precisely, the restaurant owners may bribe the customers during an opening period. However, does this strategy work if other consumers know that these early consumers are bribed?
The theory developed here also applies to examples where some individuals are opinion leaders (for whatever reason) and generate one fashion or another, or bandwagon effects because their choice behavior is imitated. Such agents are prime targets for inßuence activities, because their decision is imitated by a large set of individuals, and hence, their decisions allocate a multiple of the rents they actually generate as the direct consequences of their own behavior. However, if later consumers consider imitating their opinion leaders and know that their decisions were based on superior information, but also on bribes, should they still imitate them, or perhaps trust their own judgement?
Summarizing, the research question in this paper is as follows. In the absence of inßuence activities, consumers with superior information become opinion leaders whose choices are imitated by other consumers. The leaders' decisions allocate large amounts of producer rents. Firms should therefore have an incentive to inßuence the decisions of opinion leaders. But this inßuence may weaken their leadership. If an opinion leader is known to make a consumption choice because he was bribed to make this choice, the informational value of his choice may be discounted or eliminated. This, in turn would make the inßuence activity less proÞtable, or even useless. The central question this paper is whether inßuence activities occur, how they inßuence the decision process, and how they allocate rents. Will the better informed consumer who decides Þrst and who may induce an information cascade earn a rent? Will inßuence activity be able to destroy the signal that is provided by the Þrst consumer's choice? It will turn out that the answers depend on the quality of the mechanism through which inßuence activity affects decisions, and on symmetry properties of the producers. As the amounts producers would want to spend on inßuence activities in the equilibrium in a market early on are considerable, deep pockets and liquidity constraints are of particular importance. Liquidity constraints turn out to be a useful commitment device, particularly if all producers are constrained, but they beneÞt producers even if not all producers face liquidity constraints.
The main framework and a benchmark case is set out in the next section. Section 3 considers deviations from this benchmark, concentrating in particular on noisy bribes and on the beneÞts of liquidity constraints or deep pockets. Section 4 concludes.
2 The opinion leadership framework I consider two Þrms producing goods a and b, respectively. Further, there are n consumers, indexed by i. Each of these consumers decides whether to buy one unit of good a, one unit of good b, or nothing at all. Consumer 1 ('she') chooses Þrst; all other consumers choose later. Firms' per-unit production cost is normalized to zero, and there are no capacity constraints. Firms Þrst choose the price of their product charged to consumer 1. As will turn out, this price will typically be negative in the equilibrium, as it includes an element of bribes. I will denote what the Þrms pay to consumer 1 (net of any price received from the consumer) if she purchases the Þrm's product as s a and s b , respectively, and I will denote these net transfers from producers to consumer 1 as 'bribes'.
Prices for other consumers are chosen when consumer 1 has made her choice. These prices will be p a and p b , respectively, and the rationale that guides the choice of these prices is explained in detail below.
Coming to the consumers: there is some uncertainty about the consumers' valuation of the products a and b. All consumers have the same tastes in the sense that their valuations of the two goods are identical. However, there are two states of the world. In state A all consumers attribute a value of 1 to good a and a value of 0 to good b. In state B all consumers attribute a value of 0 to good a and a value of 1 to good b. The state of nature is uncertain and producers and all consumers i = 2, ...n attribute ex ante equal probabilities to the two states. However, consumer 1 privately receives an informative signal. This signal changes her belief that state A occurs to θ ∈ (0, 1), where θ is a random variable that, for simplicity, is assumed to be uniformly distributed on the unit interval. I will assume that only the opinion leader observes the signal. The producers and the consumers i = 2, ...n do not.
The consumer 1 has an information advantage compared to other consumers, and chooses Þrst. As her choice is observable and may affect other consumers' choices, I will call her the opinion leader. Consider her choice now. If she chooses a, the Þrm a pays her s a . If she chooses b, Þrm b pays her s b . The opinion leader can choose at most one of the products.
As Þrms try to inßuence her behavior in order to change future consumers' behavior, they will try to hide the size of their bribes; therefore I will assume that all other consumers i = 2, ...n cannot observe the value of the bribes offered to consumer 1.
The incentive to pay the bribe in a clandestine way may also imply that there could be some value loss in the transfer from the Þrm to the customer, and I assume that what she receives has a monetary value of s a −² a . Similarly, if b's bribe s b were paid to her, its value for her would be s b −² b . Here ² a and ² b are random variables, and I will assume that ² a −² b is a random variable that is uniformly distributed on the interval [−e, e]. In this section the benchmark case in which there is random element, ² a = ² b = 0 is considered. The importance of noise its various intuitive interpretations will be discussed in greater detail in section 3.
Once the opinion leader has chosen one or the other product, the producers choose the price that applies to all other consumers i = 2, ...n. These prices are denoted p a and p b , respectively. These further consumers will not be bribed.
7 Other consumers observe consumer 1's choice, but not her true consumption beneÞt or the bribe. They may, or may not, learn something from her choice -that is, she may, but need not, really become an opinion leader. Then the consumers i = 2, ...n make their consumption choice simultaneously. This simultaneity is not needed for the results if the consumers i = 2, ...n do not have private information. However, the simpliÞcation will be useful when considering the case in which these consumers also have some private information.
I will Þrst consider a benchmark in which there is no noise.
Proposition 1 For ² a = ² b ≡ 0 and n ≥ 3 there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium such that consumer 1 receives bribes s a = s b = n−1 2 − 1 and always chooses a or b according to her signal, the Þrm j ∈ {a, b} whose product was chosen by consumer 1 chooses a price equal to p j = 1/2, the other Þrm chooses a price equal to zero, and all further consumers imitate consumer 1's choice. In this equilibrium, total expected rent is
Consumer 1 receives an expected rent equal to
and each consumer i = 2, ...n receives an expected rent equal to
Each producer receives an expected producer rent equal to 1 2 .
Proof: Consider Þrst the consumers i = 2, ...n. Their expected payoffs from buying good a or b depend on their posterior beliefs about the state of the world. These beliefs can be assumed to be uniform, because all these consumers are precisely in the same situation. Let α denote their probability belief that the world is in state A. As producers are uninformed, this belief cannot reasonably depend on producer prices per se. However, the belief can depend on combinations of prices and consumer 1's choice of a or b. If consumers i = 2, ...n attribute a probability α to the world being in state A, then α and (1 − α) are the expected gross beneÞts for these consumers from purchasing either a or b, respectively.
Beliefs must be correct in the equilibrium, but not necessarily out of the equilibrium. Let the consumers i = 2, ...n assume that s a = s b , and that the opinion leader made a rational choice on the basis of her information and the bribes offered to her. The anticipated bribes then 'neutralize' each other. Hence, given that θ is uniformly distributed and assuming s a = s b , they conclude that θ ≥ 1/2 if she chooses a and that θ ≤ 1/2 if she chooses b. As E(θ¯θ ≥ 
The maximum willingness to pay for each of these consumers (vis-a-vis not buying at all) for product a and b is limited by this value of α and (1 − α), respectively. They buy one of the products only if their rent is non-
Suppose in this case they buy the product which is more expensive.
8 If the consumers are indifferent and both products have the same price, consumers may randomize.
Consider now the incentives of the Þrms to set prices for consumers i = 2, ...n. For a given choice of consumer 1, and given anticipated values s a = s b , the consumers calculate α as in (1). Knowing this, the two Þrms engage in Bertrand competition. In the equilibrium this leads to a price equal to zero for the Þrm whose product was not chosen by the opinion leader, and a price equal to |α − (1 − α)| = 1/2 for the Þrm whose product was chosen by the opinion leader, where the last equality follows from (1).
Consider now the choice behavior of the opinion leader. As the noise terms ² a and ² b are set equal to zero, she chooses
and b if the reverse inequality holds. Equality in (2) is a zero probability event and we can assume any tie-breaking rule for this case without affecting the results. Consider Þnally the incentives of the Þrms to choose bribes. At this stage Þrm a maximizes the following payoff:
This payoff is the product of the probability that the opinion leader chooses a for given bribes s a and s b , and the rent that the Þrm earns if the leader chooses a and, hence, induces all other consumers to choose a. Making use of the assumption that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the probability equals
The rent obtained in this case equals n − 1 times the equilibrium price 1/2 charged to consumers i = 2, ...n, minus the bribe that has to be paid to consumer 1 in this case. This makes use of the assumption that the production cost were normalized to zero. The payoff of Þrm b is obtained by replacing subscripts a by subscripts b.
If the Þrms simultaneously maximize these payoffs, Þrms' reaction functions can be obtained from the Þrst-order conditions. Firm a's reaction correspondence is
The second line in (5) represents the Þrst-order condition. For sufficiently large s b it is not optimal for a to offer a bribe that could be accepted with positive probability, but any smaller bribe is optimal. This case is characterized by the Þrst line in (5). For sufficiently small s b , it is optimal for a to offer a bribe that is just large enough to make the consumer choose a for all values of θ. In this case s a = s b + 1 is just sufficient, and this leads to the third line in (5). The reaction correspondence for Þrm b is obtained by replacing all subscripts a by b and vice versa. The reaction correspondences overlap or intersect at exactly at one point with s a = s b = n−1 2 − 1 if n ≥ 3. ¤ Proposition 1 considers a situation with an informed consumer who has the potential of becoming an opinion leader. Firms have an incentive to bribe this consumer to inßuence the consumer's choice, because her choice can move the whole market. Indeed, if the technology of bribing the opinion leader is fully efficient, that is, if it is just a transfer of money from the Þrm to the consumer that does not generate any extra cost or noise, the position of the opinion leader is very powerful. She captures almost all the producer rent that is generated by all sales to future customers.
The result can be used to address Dichter's (1966) discussion of the problem that Þrms should try to inßuence opinion leaders, but that there is a danger that this inßuence may destroy the channel by which opinion leaders change the market outcome because their judgement or choice becomes less valuable or even useless for those who would like to beneÞt from their superior information. If Þrms Þnd efficient ways to bribe the opinion leaders, then their consumer choice is as informative for future consumers as without such bribes. However, at the same time, the market outcome is not very satisfactory from the point of view of producers. They sacriÞce all rent on selling to consumers i = 2, ...n by bribing the informed consumer.
Generalizations and Robustness
Proposition 1 considers a bechmark case. In what follows I will discuss some of the assumptions of this benchmark case and their importance for the result.
Informed followers. It was assumed in Proposition 1 that consumers i = 2, ...n are completely uninformed. It is evident in this case that they do not have much to lose by following the opinion leader. This assumption makes herd behavior particularly likely. Even a bit of information obtained from observing the leader's choice is better than no information. Therefore, even if the bribes weakened the opinion leader's signal, this would not make them rely on their own information, because they have none.
Suppose that all consumers i = 2, ...n also get a signal. Generally, this will complicate the choice of prices p a and p b , as consumers i = 2, ...n will update their beliefs on the basis of the observed behavior of the leader and their own information and the outcome will depend on the characteristics of the signals. Assume, for instance, that all consumers know they received exactly the same signal as the opinion leader with some positive probability µ and a signal that is simply noise with probability (1 − µ). In this case not much changes. The undistorted leader's action reveals information that is strictly superior to their own information, and not even the problem of choosing p a and p b will be affected in the continuation game in which the leader's choice can be taken as a choice that is fully based on her signal.
Word-of-mouth. Observing opinion leaders' choices is one way their superior information is transferred to other consumers. The marketing literature emphasizes that opinion leaders' consumption choices are only one channel by which they may transmit their information. Opinion leaders also act as informal advisors for their friends and neighbours. Bribing may then be more or less difficult than if the information transmission occurs via observed consumer choices. On the one hand side, it may take less to bribe someone to give wrong advice, as this does not lead to a personal sacriÞce. The advisor does not have to consume the inferior product himself. On the other hand, advice is 'soft' and often not observable or veriÞable from the outside. Hence, it may be difficult for the Þrm that bribes an opinion leader to make sure that the opinion leader really recommends this Þrm's product. She may take the bribe and then recommend the superior product anyway, particularly if the opinion leader cares about her own reputation in a larger context, or if she feels altruistic with respect to the persons she advises.
To overcome this problem Þrms will need to monitor the opinion leader, or to make the bribe a function of sales, or to use persuasive advertizing that makes the opinion leader a 'true believer'. Despite these problems, if inßuence activities are at work, the basic insights from the previous section are also likely to hold if the information is transmitted by 'word of mouth'. Firms will choose symmetric bribes, and hence, the opinion leader's action is still a function of the signal he received.
Typically, in these cases the inßuence activity cannot be a simple transfer of money. It is then more likely that the effect of the money spent on inßuence activities is not deterministic, making the inßuence activity a 'noisy' one. As 'noise' can also have other sources, I consider this aspect in a separate paragraph.
Noise. Suppose that the money value from receiving a bribe is not deterministic. Bribes arrive at the recipient only with some noise. For instance, if the early customers of a new product receive a welcome present, or another in-kind transfer that is produced by the Þrm, there is some uncertainty about how a customer will value the gift. The valuation could exceed, but will typically fall short of, the cost this gift has for the Þrm by some amount ² a and ² b for the two Þrms, respectively, and the deviation may also be difficult to predict for the Þrm making the gift. Accordingly, the money value received has some element of randomness or noise. For given bribes by Þrms a and b, the relevant noise variable is the difference between ² a and ² b .
We consider the case in which consumer 1 can observe the actual value of s i −² i when she receives the offers for bribes. That is, the consumer knows the monetary value she attributes to receiving a particular gift or other beneÞt, but the Þrms or other consumers cannot observe these monetary values. ] − 1 to the opinion leader, the opinion leader chooses the product according to her signal, the consumers i = 2, ...n choose the same product as the opinion leader and pay a price
A proof is in the appendix. Proposition 2 looks at the case in which noise is not very big. The case e > 1 can be analysed along similar lines and yields qualitatively similar results. The assumption ² a , ² b > − 1 2 is sufficient to make sure that consumer 1 always accepts one of the equilibrium bribes. It is meant to rule out the uninteresting case in which even a positive bribe is not attractive enough to make the consumer 1 choose one of the products.
Intuitively, Proposition 2 shows that some noise does not change the result of the no-noise case qualitatively. The noise makes the opinion leader's signal less valuable, but does not destroy it. As the signal is less valuable, the proÞt that is earned from selling to the consumers that follow the leader's choice is lower, and the equilibrium bribe is therefore reduced. Overall there is a welfare loss, as the opinion leader makes the wrong choice more frequently than if she just followed her signal, and the consumers who imitate her behavior replicate this mistake if it occurs.
Deep pockets and liquidity constraints. Let us return to the benchmark case without noise. As shown in Proposition 1, opinion leadership induces Þrms to make considerable up-front payments when trying to attract the whole market. Firms spend all their future proÞt on early customers who inßuence later consumers. These up-front payments require 'deep pockets'. A Þrm that is liquidity constrained cannot spend all of its future proÞts or a major share of them in a market on initial campaigns, advertisement and consumer discounts.
There are two issues one can look at. Consider Þrst a symmetric case in which the two Þrms are equally liquidity constrained and unable to offer the unconstrained equilibrium bribe. They will both offer the maximum possible bribe. As long as this is correctly anticipated by the consumers i = 2, ...n, it will not affect the pricing game, but the early consumer will receive a smaller bribe. Hence, if both Þrms are liquidity constrained, this beneÞts the Þrms and harms the early consumer.
Consider asymmetric liquidity constraints. Let one Þrm be liquidity constrained, and let the other Þrm have deep pockets. In this case the bribes offered by the Þrms will not necessarily be symmetric, leading to distorted consumption decisions by consumer 1. In turn, this will change the information that can be extracted from consumer 1's choice. It will turn out that this makes inßuence activities less effective and reduces, but does not eliminate, the rent transfer to consumer 1. It is also interesting to ask whether a unilateral liquidity constraint is a strategic advantage or a disadvantage. A proof and a calculation of consumer 1's rent are in the appendix. Intuitively, Þrm a can choose a positive subsidy such that the Þrst consumer chooses product a with a probability that is higher than one half, and the Þrm has an incentive to do this. However, the consumers i = 2, ...n anticipate the optimal bribe, and that for this bribe the choice of a reveals an information about θ that differs from the symmetric case. In some cases in which, disregarding the bribe, the consumer had a mild preference for b consumer 1 still chooses a. This reduces the value of the Þrst consumer's choice a as a signal, whereas the choice of b becomes an even more valuable signal. Accordingly, Þrm a's bribe has a positive externality for Þrm b, as it increases this Þrm's equilibrium price. Overall, both Þrms beneÞt from this unilateral bribes, but Þrm b beneÞts from a's inßuence activities by even more than Þrm a. Firm b ends up with a payoff even higehr than the unconstrained Þrm's payoff for all n > 3.
The asymmetry and the 'wrong' decision this asymmetry causes with respect to some of consumer 1's choices also cause an inefficiency, and the herd behavior of all other consumers magniÞes this inefficiency.
Endogenous leadership. It is plausible to assume that opinion leaders already exist in a society and are exogenously given for a Þrm that innovates a new product. However, as opinion leaders capture a large share of rents, members in a society have an incentive to become opinion leaders and may have some instruments for achieving this goal. The marketing literature has studied the various determinants of opinion leadership. Some of these determinants are social independence and social integration (Wilkie 1986) and are not really a matter of choice, or at least difficult to change in the short run.
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Another determinant that is well documented to be an important determinant for a consumer to become and act as an opinion leader is the consumer's information or expertise (Grewal, Mehta and Kardes 2000) , and this variable is most obviously endogenous from the point of view of a consumer. Accordingly, at least some persons should have considerable incentives to acquire information in a society in which opinion leadership matters and generates a leadership rent. The information acquisition process may dissipate some or all of the opinion leaders' expected rent. But the incentive to acquire information will also contribute to overcoming the market inefficiency that is typically associated with the public good property of consumers' product information.
Discussion
This paper considers markets in which some consumers have an information advantage about product quality. Such consumers could choose early and, if their choice is publicly observed, act as opinion leaders and generate herd behavior on the part of other consumers. Firms that compete for customers also know which consumer has an information advantage and could therefore act as an opinion leader. They may therefore approach these consumers and try and inßuence the leader's choice by bribes. In this paper I show that efficient bribes do not affect the opinion-leader's choice in the equilibrium. Hence, her choice has the same value as a signal to further consumers as in the absence of bribes. However, the bribes shift almost all rent away from the Þrms and to the opinion leader.
Bribes could potentially distort the signal that the leader's choice could otherwise give to further consumers. In this paper I show that this becomes indeed a problem if bribes involve noise. Noise can then reduce the quality of the opinion leader's choice as a signal. This leads to less efficient market outcomes in which the followers make an inefficient product choice more frequently, in which the opinion leader receives lower bribes and also the Þrms may have lower proÞts in the equilibrium.
Also, asymmetry of Þrms, e.g., with respect to liquidity constraints, can cause a welfare loss if these Þrms may use bribes to inßuence opinion lead-ers' consumption choice, and these inefficiencies are magniÞed by the herd behavior that is induced by the opinion leaders' choice.
Summarizing, the market outcome with opinion leaders and inßuence activities puts opinion leaders in a fortunate position. They extract huge rents. Accordingly, the position as opinion leader is very attractive. In turn, this may induce individuals to make investments in information acquisition, and in activities by which they credibly reveal having made these investment choices. To some extent this effect may counteract the inefficiencies that may prevail otherwise in markets in which product quality is unknown and investments need to be made in learning product quality.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider Þrst the consumers i = 2, ...n. Their expected payoffs from buying good a or b depends on their posterior beliefs about the state of the world. These beliefs can be assumed to be identical for all i = 2, ...n, because all these consumers are in the same situation. Let α again denote their probability belief of the world being in state A. Then α and (1 − α) are the expected beneÞts for a consumer from purchasing either a or b, respectively.
Let the consumers believe that s a = s b as before, that consumer 1 made a rational choice on the basis of her information and the bribes offered to her, where the actual bribes are not observed by i = 2, ...n. Consider their expectations. Consumer 1 will choose a if
and b if the reverse inequality holds, 12 if the participation constraint max{(θ+ s a − ² a ), (1 − θ − s b − ² b )} ≥ 0 is fulÞlled. This constraint can be disregarded, given the limits that are imposed on ² a and ² b in the proposition. I do not consider this in detail here.
If consumers i = 2, ...n expect s a = s b , then, also using the assumptions about uniform and stochastically independent distributions of θ and of (² a − ² b ), they calculate α given that the opinion leader chooses a and b, respectively, as follows.
Consider E(θ |2θ − 1 > ² a − ² b ). Recall that θ is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1] and ² a − ² b is uniformly distributed on the interval [−e, +e] with e ≤ 1, and θ and ² a − ² b are stochastically independent. DeÞne
Now consider
Accordingly,
. Consumers i = 2, ...n will use this as their updated belief about the probability of the states of nature:
if consumer 1 buys a E(θ |2θ − 1 < ² a − ² b )) = 
Note that this α converges towards 3/4 and 1/4 for e → 0. The maximum willingness to pay for each of these consumers (vis-a-vis not buying at all) for product a and b is equal to α and (1 − α), respectively. Consumers buy exactly one of the products if at least one of the prices p a or p b falls short of the respective critical limit. Accordingly, they buy a if α − p a > (1 − α) − p b and b if the reverse inequality holds. Again I adopt the tie-breaking rule that is standard in asymmetric Bertrand games that, if equality holds, they all choose the product with the higher price. If equality holds and both products have the same price, they randomize. Consider now the incentives of the Þrms to set prices for consumers i = 2, ...n given the expectations as in (9). The two Þrms engage in Bertrand competition. This leads to a price equal to zero for the Þrm whose product was not chosen by consumer 1, and a price equal to |α
for the Þrm whose product was chosen by consumer 1.
Consider next the choice behavior of consumer 1. She chooses
The opinion leader chooses b if the reverse inequality holds. The case of equality is a zero probability event and we can adopt any tie-breaking rule for this case, without affecting the results. Consider Þnally the incentives of the Þrms to choose bribes. Firm a's payoff is zero if consumer 1 chooses b. Firm a earns n−1 times the equilibrium price p a = 1 2 − e 2 6 from selling to consumers i = 2, ...n if consumer 1 chooses product a, and has the cost of the bribe s a in this case. This happens with a probability
Accordingly, Þrm a's payoff can be written as
( 1 2 ( 1 4 ) Using s * b = 0 and the assumption that θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], the expected value of good a for a consumer i = 2, ...n if consumer 1 chooses a then equals 
Turning to the Þrms' choices of p a and p b , suppose Þrst consumer 1 chose a. Firm b will choose p b = 0 and Þrm a will charge the maximum difference that the consumers are willing to pay for a instead of b. This difference is p a = 2α − 1 = . This shows that an increase in a's bribe increases the probability that consumer 1 chooses a, but decreases the equilibrium price that Þrm a can charge to all subsequent consumers in this case. This causes a trade-off for Þrm a.
If consumer 1 chose b, then the other consumers believe that α = . It is interesting to note that the price that Þrm b can charge once consumer 1 has chosen b, is higher the higher the bribe chosen by Þrm a. Hence, an increase in a's bribe decreases the probability that b is chosen, but increases the price that b can charge to all other consumers in this case.
Consumer 1's choice has already been considered implicitly above.
Coming to the Þrm's choice of bribes, the payoff of Þrm a is Π a = ( 1 2 + s a 2 )((n − 1)( 1 2 − s * a 2 ) − s a ).
( 1 > 0 for all s b < 0 and n ≥ 3. Hence, among the bribe offers that are feasible for this Þrm, b would want to choose the maximum bribe s * b = 0.
